The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled September 25, 2026, that Kalshi’s sports-event contracts are not swaps under the Commodity Exchange Act, allowing Ohio and Tennessee to enforce state gambling laws against the exchange. The published opinion covered two appeals, KalshiEX LLC v. Schuler, No. 26-3196, and KalshiEX LLC v. Orgel, No. 26-5235.
The ruling affirmed an Ohio district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction and vacated a Tennessee injunction Kalshi had won in February. It also deepened a federal appellate split over who gets to police sports event contracts: state gambling regulators or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Kalshi has now lost on that issue in two appellate courts in less than a month. The Ninth Circuit sided with Nevada regulators in KalshiEX LLC v. Assad on August 28, 2026. The Third Circuit, in KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty, held in April that Kalshi had shown a likelihood of success on its argument that federal law preempts New Jersey’s gambling laws. New Jersey’s Supreme Court petition is docketed as No. 26-299, with Kalshi’s response due November 9, 2026.
What did the Sixth Circuit decide?
Judge Julia Smith Gibbons, joined by Judges Eric Clay and Rachel Bloomekatz, framed the case around three issues. The court held that Kalshi could sue to challenge state enforcement, that its sports-event contracts do not meet the CEA’s statutory definition of a swap, and that the CEA would not preempt Ohio and Tennessee gambling laws even if the contracts were swaps.
The swap analysis centered on 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii), which covers contracts whose payment depends on an event associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence. The Sixth Circuit agreed with Kalshi that a sports result can be an event. It rejected, however, Kalshi’s broader argument that sports outcomes qualify because professional sports are tied to money for leagues, advertisers, sponsors, broadcasters, franchises and local economies.
The court said the statutory phrase requires a closer relationship between the event and the financial consequence. In the panel’s formulation, the event must be intrinsically associated with a financial consequence in a way that explains why hedging risk or learning price information about that event would be useful. Interest rates fit that model. The court said Super Bowl MVP, corner kicks in a soccer game and whether an announcer says a particular word on air do not.
Why did the court reject Kalshi’s sports-economy argument?
Kalshi argued that sports outcomes carry financial consequences for sponsors, advertisers, television networks, franchises and local communities. The Sixth Circuit called that link too attenuated and said Kalshi’s reading had no workable limiting principle.
The opinion used Kalshi’s own examples and litigation record to make the point. According to the court, Kalshi had offered or described contracts involving the number of corner kicks in a soccer match, whether a broadcaster says a specified word, and multi-leg sports propositions. The panel said those products were not meaningfully comparable to instruments traditionally understood as swaps.
The court also relied on concessions from Kalshi’s counsel. At oral argument, the opinion said, Kalshi acknowledged that a layperson might find it hard to see how some contracts carried economic consequences. The opinion also pointed to prior statements in the Nevada litigation that Kalshi’s sports-event contracts had no inherent economic significance and carried no economic risks.
A broader concern shaped the court’s reading of the statute. The CEA makes it unlawful for most people to enter into swaps outside a designated contract market. If ordinary sports bets were swaps, the panel reasoned, wagers at casinos, online sportsbooks or between private individuals could be swept into federal commodities law. The Sixth Circuit said that result weighed against Kalshi’s interpretation.
Does CFTC jurisdiction block state gambling laws?
No, the Sixth Circuit said. The panel held that the CEA’s exclusive-jurisdiction clause, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A), does not broadly displace state gambling laws. The court read the provision as allocating regulatory authority over swaps and designated contract markets, not as a general shield against state laws that incidentally affect a CFTC-regulated exchange.
The court contrasted that language with other CEA provisions that expressly use preemption wording, including 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2). In the Sixth Circuit’s view, Congress knew how to write a direct preemption clause and did not use that wording in the exclusive-jurisdiction provision at issue.
The panel did recognize a narrower federal sphere. State rules that directly regulate the licensing or operation of designated contract markets can be displaced. But Ohio and Tennessee gambling laws, as applied to Kalshi’s sports contracts, did not directly target DCM licensing or operations, the court said. Field preemption and conflict preemption failed for similar reasons.
How did Ohio and Tennessee get to the Sixth Circuit?
Kalshi self-certified its first sports-event contracts with the CFTC on January 22, 2025, according to the Sixth Circuit opinion. Ohio regulators later sent a cease-and-desist letter accusing the exchange of unlicensed sports gaming and warned licensed sportsbooks about associating with Kalshi. Kalshi sued in the Southern District of Ohio, Case No. 2:25-cv-01165, where Chief Judge Sarah Daggett Morrison denied a preliminary injunction.
A Sixth Circuit motions panel refused to enjoin Ohio while the appeal was pending. In an April 24, 2026 order cited by the merits panel, the court said Kalshi had shown at most that the merits were in equipoise, which was not enough to block Ohio’s gambling laws pending appeal.
Tennessee followed a different procedural path. The Tennessee Sports Wagering Council sent its own cease-and-desist letter in early 2026. Kalshi sued in the Middle District of Tennessee, Case No. 3:26-cv-00034, and Judge Aleta Arthur Trauger granted a preliminary injunction on conflict-preemption grounds. Tennessee officials appealed, and the Sixth Circuit heard the Tennessee and Ohio cases together.
The CFTC appeared as an amicus in the Ohio appeal. Other amici included the Nevada and Utah attorneys general, the Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation, Better Markets and the Coalition for Prediction Markets. The panel acknowledged the coalition’s argument that prediction markets can provide economic information, but said the cited sports hedging examples did not show that Kalshi’s sports contracts were commonly used to hedge financial risk.
What does Kalshi say now?
Kalshi disagreed with the ruling and said it expected further review. Spokesperson Dani Lever told The Block that the law does not require a swap to involve intrinsic financial consequences and argued that sports have clear economic effects. Lever also said a state-by-state regime is incompatible with a national market structure.
The immediate legal map is uneven. The Third Circuit has sided with Kalshi against New Jersey. The Ninth Circuit has sided with Nevada. The Sixth Circuit has now sided with Ohio and Tennessee. The Fourth Circuit appeal involving Maryland, KalshiEX LLC v. Martin, No. 25-1892, remains another pending front in the same fight.
The Supreme Court docket in Flaherty v. KalshiEX LLC now includes New Jersey’s petition, several amicus filings and an October 7, 2026 amicus brief submitted by Ohio, 38 other states and the District of Columbia. The next fixed milestone is November 9, 2026, when Kalshi’s response to New Jersey’s petition is due.
For Ohio and Tennessee, the practical effect is immediate. The injunction against Tennessee is gone, Ohio’s denial of an injunction stands, and the Sixth Circuit opinion states that Kalshi does not currently comply with either state’s gaming laws.